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Introduction and summary
On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed 
into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA).1 The legislation represents the most recent 
attempt by the federal government to provide counter-
cyclical aid to states and localities suffering from fiscal 
stress stemming from a broad-based economic recession.2 
The legislation follows the pattern of previous federal 
aid programs in that it provides a combination of direct 
program support (Medicaid, unemployment insurance, 
and education aid) and infrastructure grants. The inten-
tion is to provide two forms of relief. First, the program 
aid will serve as a stabilizer for state and local govern-
ments by allowing them to maintain (or at least mini-
mize the reduction in) key expenditure areas. Second, 
the infrastructure money is intended to serve as a stimulus 
and potential job creator. The ARRA’s emphasis on job 
creation and economic growth objectives makes it a 
little different from past federal aid programs; tradition-
ally these have focused heavily on fiscal stabilization.3
While states and localities often support such gen-
erosity from Washington, there are several questions 
that remain regarding the efficacy of countercyclical 
federal aid. In this article, we discuss the rationale for 
federal assistance and examine different mechanisms 
for its distribution. Of particular interest is whether the 
aid program is calibrated to reflect changes in the busi-
ness cycle. Since this is countercyclical aid, it is in-
tended only to ameliorate changes in business cycle 
conditions that have a direct impact on state budgets 
and not to facilitate poor budget policy by state and 
local governments. Through empirical analysis, we 
model the effects of the use of different economic 
triggers to start and stop aid over the business cycle 
and examine how these triggers would have performed 
over previous business cycles. The triggers we use 
are the unemployment rate, measured as the excess 
rate above a specific unemployment threshold; the 
change in sales tax revenues, relative to a four-quarter 
moving average decline in revenues by more than 5 per-
cent; and the change in a state-specific business cycle 
indicator (the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 
state coincident indexes). Clearly, decisions about the 
timing and targeting of aid are critical to structuring 
an appropriate federal response to states’ financial 
difficulties. We find that the Philadelphia Fed’s coin-
cident indexes do a relatively good job of timing aid 
to reflect both the local intensity of the business cycle 
in individual states and the duration of the recession 
on a national level. The use of such a trigger would 
improve the likelihood that the aid would reduce the 
stress related to the business cycle, as opposed to the 
stress caused by structural imbalances in a given state’s 
economy or fiscal system.
Purpose and structure of aid
The idea of federal support for state (and local) 
governments in a downturn is hardly a new one. For 
example, in response to the recession of 1973–75,4 
Congress enacted the Antirecession Fiscal Assistance 
(ARFA) program, which was combined with general 
revenue sharing grants and the Local Public Works 
(LPW) program to provide unrestricted grants and infra-
structure funding to the states. In addition, Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (CETA) in 1973 and, in conjunction with these other 
programs, this became an anti-recessionary mechanism 
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for delivering job training. More recently, in 2003, 
Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act, as states dealt with a slow recovery 
from the 2001 recession. 
The purpose of such funding is primarily to stabilize 
fiscal behavior in the state government sector. This aid 
is intended to smooth the budgetary actions states would 
be forced to take in the face of declining revenues and 
increasing expenditure demands from programs such 
as Medicaid and unemployment insurance. In practice, 
the composition of state spending has become more 
countercyclical, given that health and education pro-
grams now consume larger shares (relative to spending 
in the past) of state budgets and tend to have rising 
program demands during economic downturns. The 
federal government sometimes adds an infrastructure 
element to its aid as a way of increasing demand in the 
construction sector and stimulating the economy. How-
ever, economic stimulus is clearly a secondary objective 
of this aid; if the federal government’s primary purpose 
were to provide an economic stimulus, it would prob-
ably be better off simply spending the money directly 
rather than funneling it through the states.
Federal response to the 1973–75 recession
The 1973–75 recession lasted 16 months and was 
strongly associated with the rapid rise of oil prices and 
the U.S. moving off the gold standard. The Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled 
prices in 1973 and this, combined with high inflation, 
led to three quarters of negative growth and an unem-
ployment rate that peaked at 9 percent in 1975. This 
recession was also notable for the government’s creation 
of wage and price controls in an effort to restrain in-
flation.5 Inflation peaked at 12.6 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 1974.
In response, the federal government passed three 
programs in 1976 designed to help states and localities. 
These were expanded in 1977. The package had three 
components: public works, anti-recession general as-
sistance, and public employment and work force training. 
In all, $14.5 billion was allocated to the states from 
November 1975 to March 1978.6
Aid from the three programs was divided as follows: 
$5.7 billion for local public works, $2.5 billion for anti-
recession fiscal assistance, and $6.3 billion for employ-
ment and training through the Comprehensive Education 
and Training Act (CETA). All three programs used 
measures of unemployment to trigger eligibility for 
aid. For the local public works and CETA programs, 
a national unemployment rate in excess of 6.5 percent 
was the baseline measure; for the anti-recessionary 
aid, a 6 percent national unemployment rate triggered 
fund allocations to states with local unemployment 
rates exceeding 4.5 percent.
Evaluating the effectiveness of the aid
Detailed evaluations of the aid programs were 
presented in reports by the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO, 1977) and the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO, 1978).
The GAO report specifically examined Title II of 
the Public Works Employment Act of 1976. This was 
one component of the federal government’s response 
to the recession. The stated goal of the program was 
“to offset destabilizing fiscal action of state and local 
governments during recessions and, in particular, to main-
tain basic services customarily provided with the empha-
sis placed on wages and salaries of public employees.”7
Specifically, Title II of the act authorized the dis-
tribution of $1.25 billion over five quarters from July 
1976 through September 1977. The GAO report fo-
cused on five areas of inquiry:
n	Was the provision of aid to state and local juris-
dictions timely so that it was an effective tool to 
counter economic recession?
n  What was the magnitude of destabilizing fiscal 
action by state and local governments during the 
economic downturn?
n  Was the aid targeted effectively so that it was 
directed to those state and local jurisdictions that 
suffered most from the impact of the recession?
n  Was the level of excess unemployment (which 
was defined in the law as any rate above 4.5 per-
cent) the best indicator of the impact of the re-
cession on states and localities?
n  Was the effect of the recession a less serious 
problem for state and local governments than 
long-term structural problems associated with  
secular decline?
The report’s findings suggested several flaws in 
the federal assistance program. For example, the excess 
unemployment rate trigger was not sensitive enough 
to reflect cyclical change in state economies. In addi-
tion, it was not clear that the recession by itself was 
sufficient to cause destabilizing state and local fiscal 
actions. In the case of this recession, inflation played 
a significant role. Further, the use of the excess unem-
ployment rate to allocate aid also failed, as it was un-
clear that excess unemployment directly reflected the 
impact of the recession on the state or local budget. 
Finally, the report found that the program appeared to 
provide aid that was most closely related to patterns 
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experienced relatively low growth rates prior to the 
recession received disproportionate shares of aid. 
This was not the intent of the legislation. 
The report identified a basic tension in the legis-
lation between simply supporting the state and local 
government sector and anticipating that aid to state 
and local governments would stimulate the economy. 
The report had no direct findings on the degree to 
which the aid stimulated the economy, but suggested 
that this should be considered in crafting any future 
anti-recessionary response.8
In the CBO report, a key finding was that the in-
tent of the federal action needed to be explicit. There 
can be conflicting pressures when programs are de-
signed for both economic and fiscal stabilization. If the 
goal is economic stabilization (and the federal govern-
ment wants to use states and localities as agents for 
distributing funds), the CBO suggested that targeted 
grants would be the best form of aid, since these can 
be earmarked for specific programs and populations 
that are in need of economic stabilization due to a re-
cession. A further advantage is that targeted grants are 
less likely to serve as substitutes for state and local reve-
nues and cannot be used to rebuild state or local sur-
pluses. If the purpose is fiscal stabilization, unrestricted 
aid or broad block grants are more effective, since 
they allow states to maintain their aggregate spending 
level without (or with minimal) fiscal adjustment.9
Federal response to the double-dip 
recession, 1980 and 1981–83
The 1980 recession lasted only six months and was 
marked by record high interest rates and a spike in en-
ergy prices. This was followed by a deeper, 16-month 
recession beginning in July of 1981, during which the 
continued impact of high interest rates (peaking at 21.5 
percent in June 1982) and high energy prices caused a 
spike in unemployment; the national unemployment rate 
reached 10.8 percent in November and December 1982. 
The federal response was along two dimensions. 
First, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act was 
passed in 1983. This was forecasted to create 320,000 
jobs. The act also authorized up to six weeks of ex-
tended unemployment insurance benefits. Second, the 
Emergency Jobs Act of 1983 was passed. This provided 
$9 billion for 77 different federal programs designed 
to stimulate economic growth and job creation (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1986).
Evaluating the effectiveness of the aid
The GAO evaluated the Emergency Jobs Act in 
December 1986. Their evaluation focused on: 1) when 
funds were spent; 2) when and how many people were 
employed; 3) how many unemployed persons were 
provided with jobs; 4) what efforts were made to pro-
vide employment to the unemployed; and 5) what ben-
efits, other than employment, were provided.
The GAO found that the program was enacted 
faster than previous countercyclical federal programs. 
The bill became law 21 months after the beginning of 
the 1981 recession. The previous average for congres-
sional action was 27 months after the onset of a reces-
sion. However, the GAO also found that funds from 
the act were spent slowly and unevenly and relatively 
few jobs could be attributed to the program. In all, the 
GAO estimated that by June of 1984 only 35,000 jobs 
could be attributed directly to the act. Specifically the 
report states, “…from its review of projects and avail-
able data, GAO found that 1) unemployed persons re-
ceived a relatively small portion of the jobs provided, 
and 2) project officials’ efforts to provide employment 
opportunities to the unemployed ranged from no effort 
being made to working closely with state unemployment 
agencies to locate unemployed persons” (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1986).
In conclusion, the GAO report suggested that fu-
ture job creation programs should emphasize channeling 
money to programs that are able to spend money quickly 
and have projects available that can be implemented im-
mediately. Further, it recommended that agencies should 
be obligated to spend funds within a specific period.
Federal response to the 1990–91 recession
The 1990–91 recession followed the savings and 
loan crisis of the 1980s. In addition, the first Gulf War 
and a spike in energy prices were drags on the econo-
my during this period. This recession was relatively 
brief (eight months) and mild; GDP fell 1.3 percentage 
points from peak to trough. The impact of this reces-
sion was felt mostly on the East and West Coasts of 
the United States and, given its limited nature, no sig-
nificant anti-recessionary aid was offered beyond the 
usual programs such as extensions in unemployment 
insurance. Congress also passed the $151 billion Inter-
modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which 
helped serve as a stimulus for state and local transporta-
tion infrastructure, but this was not a direct response 
to the recession. For the most part, states drew on 
budget reserves and adjusted spending and tax policies 
to fill gaps. State revenue growth slowed during this 
period, but remained positive at 3.3 percent in fiscal 
year (FY) 1991 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1993).
Federal response to the 2001 recession
The 2001 recession reflected the bursting of the 
tech bubble and the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Like the 1990–91 recession, the 2001 downturn was 69 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
relatively short and mild. The economy contracted by 
–0.5 percent in the first quarter and –1.4 percent in 
the third quarter. Unemployment peaked at 6 percent 
after the recession ended in June 2003. However, un-
like the 1990–91 recession, this time state tax revenues 
collapsed. In particular, states with high dependence 
on the income tax found that collections turned high-
ly volatile as the underlying tax base became less pre-
dictable (see Mattoon and McGranahan, 2008). States 
quickly exhausted any reserve funds and were reluctant 
to raise major taxes. In addition, the labor market was 
slow to recover. States also complained about increased 
spending that was required to meet new security stan-
dards in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Given these 
circumstances, states pressed for federal assistance. 
The federal government responded with the Jobs and 
Growth Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the aid 
The GAO (2004) evaluated the effect of $10 billion 
in fiscal relief that was provided to the states on a largely 
unrestricted basis in the aftermath of the 2001–02 re-
cession. The aid was provided in even $5 billion allot-
ments for FY2003 and FY2004. The act was in response 
to a slow labor market recovery from the recession 
and the unanticipated sharp decline in state revenues 
that had left states with large cumulative deficits (the 
National Conference of State Legislatures estimated 
deficits at nearly $26 billion). The act authorized fed-
eral funds to be used for “providing essential govern-
ment services” and to “cover the costs of complying 
with federal intergovernmental mandate.” 
The GAO review looked at two areas:
n	What is known about the potential impacts of un-
restricted fiscal relief on state fiscal behavior?
n	How were the relief payments distributed among 
the states relative to their fiscal circumstances?
According to state budget officials, how were the 
funds used? The GAO study noted that while the funds 
were authorized 19 months after the end of the reces-
sion, the slow recovery in labor markets and continuing 
fiscal stress in the states made the timing of the aid a 
secondary concern. From the outset, the funds did not 
appear to be particularly targeted to reflect the relative 
fiscal or economic stress each state was experiencing. 
The funding formula did not take into account the  
impact of the recession, fiscal capacity, or the cost of 
expenditure responsibilities in any individual state. Funds 
were allocated on a per capita basis with an adjustment 
that provided a minimum payment for smaller states. 
The report found that by April 2004, the cumulative 
budget gap for the states had fallen to $720 million from 
$21.5 billion the previous year. States had closed the 
gap through a combination of using their own reserve 
funds and the federal fiscal relief funds. The study also 
found that it was hard to identify specifically where the 
federal dollars went once they were commingled with 
state resources. The major criticism of the program 
was that, with unrestricted funds, issues of timing and 
targeting were all the more important. Since the unre-
stricted funds were provided to all states, the potential 
existed for states with little need to substitute the federal 
funds for their own revenues to lower taxes, increase 
spending, or place funds into state reserves. None of 
these actions would effectively stabilize state budgets. 
Of particular concern was the potential for states to 
use the federal funds to avoid prudent financial plan-
ning, such as building budget reserves in anticipation 
of an economic downturn. 
When examining the specific pattern of relief pro-
vided, the GAO focused on the relationship between 
the per capita federal aid provided and changes in each 
state’s nonfarm employment and gross state product 
(GSP). On the one hand, Wyoming, which had fared 
relatively well in the recession—with a gain of more 
than 1 percent in nonfarm employment and above the 
national average gross state product per capita—received 
a much larger fiscal relief payment per capita than the 
national average. On the other hand, Indiana, Michigan, 
and Tennessee—with below national average GSP per 
capita and employment losses ranging from 1.5 percent 
to nearly 2 percent—received slightly less than the 
national average per capita fiscal relief.10
In conclusion, the GAO made two observations 
regarding the effectiveness of the program:
n	Fiscal relief payments arrived when the economy 
was already in recovery (as measured by GDP 
growth). As such, the economic stimulus value  
of the payments was doubtful.
n	However, given that employment growth lagged 
the recovery, states continued to see pressure on 
income and sales tax receipts, making the aid  
important in helping to improve the fiscal stability 
of state governments. However, the formula used 
to distribute funds was relatively insensitive to 
the degree of economic stress individual states 
were experiencing, which calls into question the 
targeting of the funds. 
A final caution issued by the GAO concerned the 
potential moral hazard of federal intervention. If states 
believe that the federal government will always inter-
cede to provide countercyclical relief, they will have 
little incentive to develop their own budgetary strategies 
to address recessions. In particular, savings programs 
such as rainy day funds may be severely undercapitalized.70 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
Federal response to the 2007–09 recession
The most recent recession has been termed the 
worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Both the 
depth and duration of the recession have been notable, 
although GDP turned positive by the third quarter of 
2009, possibly signaling the end of the cycle. For states 
and localities, tax revenues have suffered broad declines. 
Total state tax revenues turned negative in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and remained negative through the 
fourth quarter of 2009. For local governments, property 
tax revenues have been falling as communities face a 
combination of falling real estate prices and foreclosures. 
In particular, localities that favored real estate trans-
action and construction fees have found these reve-
nue sources drying up in the current cycle.
In response, the federal government passed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
The package targets three areas. The first is economic 
stimulus through $288 billion in tax cuts for individuals 
and businesses. The second is fiscal stabilization through 
targeted state programs of $224 billion for education, 
health care, and unemployment insurance. The third 
component is infrastructure spending targeted to job 
creation and investment in the form of $275 billion  
of federal contracts, grants, and loans. The fiscal sta-
bilization portion of the aid package requires states  
to demonstrate a maintenance of effort in health care 
and education programs to be eligible for the aid; and 
the infrastructure funding is geared to “shovel ready” 
projects that are past the planning stage and ready for 
construction. 
Is there a better way? 
In reviewing the recent history of countercyclical 
federal aid, it is clear that the programs must balance 
many competing interests. Regardless of the relative 
severity of the recession in a given state, there is a de-
sire to provide aid to all states rather than targeting aid 
to those suffering the most. This is most likely a politi-
cal necessity needed to gain passage of an aid program. 
There is also a tension between simply stabilizing the 
performance of the state and local sector and providing 
stimulus to the national economy through infrastructure 
and capital projects. Should the federal government at-
tach strings to the aid in an effort to redirect state fiscal 
policy? The intent of countercyclical aid is often mud-
dled and this makes evaluating its effectiveness difficult.
Finally, the timing of the aid is almost always prob-
lematic. The nature of the legislative process almost 
guarantees that the aid arrives well after the recession’s 
effects are being felt in a state. A key question is whether 
providing aid earlier in the cycle might enable states 
to adapt to recessions with less dislocation.
Defining criteria for distributing federal aid
If an aid program is primarily designed to counter 
downturns in the business cycle, the ideal program 
might be one that is almost mechanical in responding 
to business cycle movements. This would take the 
politics out of constructing aid packages and also would 
help eliminate the inevitable delay that occurs before 
Congress can act to authorize an aid program. As the 
business cycle dips, a trigger could be switched on 
once the decline reaches a designated point. Similarly, 
the trigger could be switched off once recovery is un-
der way. In other words, the trigger would be timed to 
reflect the business cycle expansion and contraction. 
Furthermore, aid should reflect the severity of the 
downturn in each state. It would seem obvious that 
states bearing the brunt of the recession should receive 
a larger share of aid than states that are less severely 
affected. However, a complicating factor is that the 
aid needs to be calibrated to only offset the cyclical 
stress of the recession. If a state enters a recession with 
a structural deficit caused by inept fiscal management, 
the federal aid should not act to make the state whole. 
Given that moral hazard is a real concern with federal 
aid, then ideally, federal aid should come with strings 
attached to encourage states to plan better for future 
business cycle declines through their own countercy-
clical measures (such as maintaining a rainy day fund). 
Timing of aid
For federal countercyclical aid to be effective, it 
must be timed to counter the economic effects associ-
ated with a decline in the business cycle. This is easier 
said than done. Ideally, the aid should start arriving to 
the states shortly after the peak in the cycle and be dis-
continued either once a recovery has begun or when a 
recovery is firmly established. In addition, there is the 
issue of whether the amount of aid should be scaled to 
reflect the severity of the downturn. Ideally, the level of 
aid would be recalibrated during each quarter to reflect 
the cyclical stress being felt by the states; this is pref-
erable to the aid being distributed as a lump sum based 
on a one-time reading of the states’ economic condition.
Another issue with timing is recognizing the lags 
in distributing the aid. Unless there is an automatic 
mechanism for triggering aid, the first lag is often the 
time it takes to secure passage of an aid bill by Congress. 
Consider the current circumstances: The National  
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates the cur-
rent recession as having begun in December 2007, and 
the aid package was enacted in February 2009. So, near-
ly five quarters had passed before aid became available 
to the states. The second lag is the time it takes for the 
federal government to distribute the aid money to the 
states. Further, the states often have to set up mechanisms 71 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
for channeling the funds into the necessary programs. 
All of this slows the process of spending the money 
during the recession. In the GAO’s assessment of the 
aid programs enacted in response to the 1973–75 re-
cession, it found that only 50 percent of the federal mon-
ey appropriated had actually been spent by the states 
even after the recession ended.11 The balance went 
either to build surpluses or reduce the states’ deficits. 
In the case of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act of 2003, the first federal funds were dis-
tributed 19 months after the end of the recession.12
An experiment based on three triggers
In this article, we use three different triggers for 
turning aid on and off over the business cycle. Our 
goal in selecting the three possible triggers was to find 
indicators that are both state specific and reported on a 
timely basis. We selected the excess unemployment rate, 
state sales tax revenues, and the Philadelphia Fed’s state 
coincident indexes. As our analysis shows, each trig-
ger performs quite differently over the business cycle.
Trigger 1: Excess unemployment rate 
The excess unemployment rate has been used in the 
past and offers several advantages. First, it is available on 
a reasonably timely basis and can be reported at differ-
ent geographic levels. The transparency of the measure 
makes it easier to assess the relative stress that different 
regions are facing and also allows for more precise tar-
geting, since (in theory) intra-state variation can be con-
sidered, allowing for specific metropolitan aid strategies. 
A clear limitation of the unemployment rate is that it 
can reflect structural change in the economy and, there-
fore, tend to be higher in some regions and lower in 
others. As such it is not necessarily a cyclical indicator. 
Also, unemployment is a lagging indicator, meaning it 
follows the business cycle’s direction with some delay 
in both upturns and downturns. As a result, it is likely 
to continue to trigger aid even when recovery is well 
under way. For this article, the unemployment trigger 
that initiates the distribution of funds will be an increase 
in the national unemployment rate from its most recent 
trough of more than 1 percentage point. Aid will be 
turned off when the national unemployment rate falls 
by at least 1 percentage point. To ensure that funding 
reflects cyclicality, once the unemployment trigger has 
begun the distribution of funds, the monthly level of 
funds allocated to each state will depend on that state’s 
net increase in unemployment relative to its most re-
cent trough. 
Trigger 2: State sales tax revenues
The general sales tax is the first or second largest 
source of general fund revenues in most states and is 
heavily relied upon for funding expenditures. Therefore, 
a decline in sales tax revenues is usually a harbinger of 
fiscal stress. Arguably, movements in sales tax revenues 
are best able to track macroeconomic cycles and do 
not suffer from the high volatility demonstrated in in-
come tax revenues, where factors such as capital gains 
and bonus income can distort the tax base. In particu-
lar, since the sales tax reflects households’ big ticket 
expenditures, a downturn in the economy (particularly 
in housing or auto sales) will be reflected in sales  
tax receipts. Finally, sales tax data are available on  
a timely basis.
The disadvantage to sales tax receipts as an indi-
cator is that policy changes enacted by states can im-
pact the sales tax base or rate. For example, many states 
have gradually added services as taxable activities. This 
has expanded the sales tax base, but the treatment of 
services is hardly uniform from state to state. Similarly, 
states have varying sales tax rates and often allow for 
local optional tax add-ons. The fact that neither the rate 
nor base is static makes assessing how much is raised 
in a given year somewhat harder. Ideally, you would 
want to measure the natural rate of growth in a fixed 
sales tax base. In our experiment, the sales tax trigger 
will turn on when the four-quarter moving average of 
national sales tax revenues falls by 5 percent and turn 
off when it returns to previous levels. Finally, there is 
also the difficulty that some states do not have a gener-
al sales tax. Therefore, the behavior of what for these 
states would be a hypothetical revenue stream would 
have to be imputed. (We exclude the states without a 
sales tax from our experiment.)
Trigger 3: Philadelphia Fed’s state coincident indexes
The biggest advantage to the state coincident in-
dexes is that they provide a state-specific index reading 
for how each state responds to the business cycle. As 
such, they allow for a measurement of variation in 
state response that permits a better understanding of 
which states are seeing the largest effects from the re-
cession. In addition, the indexes are available monthly, 
allowing for reasonably current analysis. Also, since they 
are published for all 50 states, they allow for transpar-
ency and offer a clear methodology that can be easily 
understood. Specifically, the coincident indexes consist 
of four state-level variables: nonfarm payroll employ-
ment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the un-
employment rate, and wage and salary disbursements 
deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city aver-
age). The trend for each state’s index is set to the 
trend of its gross state product, so long-term growth 
in the state’s index matches long-term growth in its 
GSP. For this trigger in our experiment, a drop of  72 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
0.1 percentage points in the month-over-
month difference in the log measure of 
the national index (which is a summary 
measure of all the state indexes) will  
turn aid on and the return of the monthly 
change in the national log measure to 0 
will turn aid off.
Defining the experiment
The first stage of this experiment is 
to examine how the three potential trig-
gers behave over the business cycle. Spe-
cifically, how long does it take for aid to 
be triggered after a recession is under 
way, and when does the aid turn off when 
recovery is detected? The second stage of 
the experiment concerns targeting of the 
aid. Using a set of rules for how the aid  
is distributed based on state-specific cri-
teria, we distribute a hypothetical aid 
package. Then we evaluate the level of 
aid received by each state. Figures 1, 2, 
and 3 demonstrate the pattern of aid that 
each trigger would have produced from 
1979 through 2009. In each figure, a period 
in which aid would have been dispersed 
is indicated by a plateau in the “aid” line 
(the specific values attained on the re-
spective vertical axes by the aid lines are 
meaningless). The vertical axis in each 
figure corresponds to the values of its respective trigger. 
In the case of figure 3, the left axis corresponds to the 
coincident index, and the right axis corresponds to the 
differenced log coincident index.
As the figures demonstrate, both the unemployment 
rate trigger and the sales tax trigger perform unpredict-
ably. The unemployment rate trigger appears to “turn on” 
in a relatively timely fashion but given the significant 
lag in employment growth relative to overall economic 
growth in the past several recessions, aid would have 
continued flowing to the states well after these recessions 
were technically over. While it would be possible to 
simply change the sensitivity of the trigger so that it 
turns off with only a modest improvement in unem-
ployment, this might be difficult for political reasons 
because it would mean ending aid to the states when 
high unemployment is still present (and state safety 
net programs are under stress). Similarly, the sales tax 
indicator shows idiosyncratic behavior. In the double-
dip recession of the early 1980s, aid would have turned 
on too early and would have stayed on well past the 
turn in the cycle. In 1990, it turns on and turns off  
after the recession ends; and in 2001, it turns on late 
and then persists well into the recovery. In the current 
cycle, it turns on a little early. 
In terms of matching the business cycle, it is not 
surprising that a business cycle indicator would do the 
best job of switching aid on and off. From a purely tech-
nical view, a rule based on changes to the Philadelphia 
Fed’s state coincident indexes would switch aid on 
and off based on cyclical movements in the economy. 
It would appear then that this would be our winning 
candidate. States might argue that if this trigger were 
used, they could be exposed to continuing fiscal stress 
after the aid stopped due to lags in their expenditure 
cycles. The argument for the use of such a trigger is 
that the goal of the aid is only to maintain state spending 
during the contraction of the business cycle.  
Rules for distributing the aid 
Once the trigger has been activated in our experi-
ment, aid will be distributed to reflect the severity of 
the downturn in the indicator for each state. Specifically, 
states will be divided into quintiles each period (either 
month or quarter, depending on the availability of data) 
according to the change in their indicator relative to 
FIguRE 1
Note: Shaded areas represent periods of recession as defined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
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its most recent peak or trough. Aid will then be allocated 
according to a set of rules that rely on these quintile 
rankings. And if a state does not have a change in its 
individual indicator to match that of the national trig-
ger, it will receive no aid.
The specific rules that govern the distribution of 
aid are designed to satisfy three guidelines that we refer 
to as “equity principles.” Each of these equity principles 
is intended to prevent allocations that would likely be 
regarded as unfair or unjust from the perspective of 
the states. They are as follows: 1) during a given month, 
all states in a given quintile should receive equal aid 
per capita; 2) during a given month, states in higher 
quintiles should receive more aid per capita than states 
in lower quintiles; and 3) within a given quintile, aid 
per capita during earlier quarters of a recession should 
meet or exceed aid per capita during later quarters.
One type of distribution plan that conforms to 
these equity principles requires policymakers to first 
select a parameter, z, which governs the size of the 
aid program. When the trigger deems necessary, each 
state then receives aid per capita equal to the product 
of z and two other constants. More specifically, 
let xq be the fraction of $z in aid per capita 
allocated to states in quintile q = 1, 2, 3, 
4, or 5 during an entire recession; and let 
yr be the fraction of this aid allocated per 
capita to states during the r th quarter of 
aid distribution. In other words, the xq 
values determine the distribution of aid 
per capita across quintiles, and the yr 
values determine the distribution of aid 
across quarters. The only restrictions on 
these variables are 0 ≤ = xq < xq+1 for all 
q and 0 ≤ = yr+1 < yr for all r, which must 
hold in order for the distribution plan to 
satisfy the equity principles. Using this 
notation, a state in quintile q during the 
rth quarter of aid distribution will receive 
$xq   yr  z of aid per capita, as long as it meets 
the initial aid criteria; otherwise, it will 
not receive aid. In the analysis that follows, 
the values we use for these variables are 
z = $130, x1 = 10%, x2 = 15%, x3 = 20%, 
x4 = 25%, x5 = 30%, y1 = 30%, y2 = 25%, 
y3 = 20%, y4 = 15%, y5 = 10%, and yn = 0 
for all n > 5. 
At this point, we must emphasize 
that this is a purely illustrative distribu-
tion plan. Although it was designed to 
satisfy certain constraints, its parameters 
are somewhat arbitrary, and there is surely 
room for improvement. For example, it 
might well be the case that to have the largest macro 
effect, the distribution of aid should be further front-
loaded to ensure that as much as possible is spent in 
the first two quarters of a recession. Another important 
question (that we do not deal with here) is what should 
be the size of the federal aid package? While this pro-
posal has the advantage of not distributing money to 
states that do not need the money (making it possible 
for the aid package to distribute less than what is origi-
nally appropriated), it does not offer guidance on the 
size of the original appropriation. It is possible that the 
package could be calibrated to some projection of  
aggregate state deficits, but these numbers are notori-
ously volatile and often in dispute. If the states are going 
to receive federal aid, then there is little incentive for 
them to understate the size of a deficit. Ideally, the size 
of the federal aid should only reflect the cyclically re-
lated portion of state deficits and not structural imbalances 
that are unrelated to a decline in the business cycle.
Attaching strings to the aid
Another possible modification to countercyclical 
aid is to limit how much of the federal money is 
FIguRE 2
Note: Shaded areas represent periods of recession as defined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census and the National Bureau of Economic Research provided by Haver 
Analytics.
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Note: Shaded areas represent periods of recession as defined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia and the National Bureau of Economic Research provided by 
Haver Analytics.
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Aid
available in outright grants. We would 
propose that some of the aid be reserved 
as loans that states would have to repay 
once revenues are restored. This would 
help limit the moral hazard problem of 
simply bailing out the states; and, like 
any loan program, the terms could be 
constructed to reflect the specific condi-
tions of the borrower.
Aid projections based on triggers 
and formula allocation
Tables A1, A2, and A3 in the appen-
dix show the quintile rankings for all 
states across four different recessions 
based on our three triggers—excess un-
employment (table A1), sales tax reve-
nues (table A2), and the state coincident 
indexes (table A3). Unlike the other two 
triggers, the state coincident indexes trig-
ger treats the 1980–82 recession as two 
separate recessions, 1980 and 1982 (see 
figures 1–3). The quintile assignment is 
based on the average quintile rank over 
the cycle and, therefore, is simply an  
illustration of where the stationary rank 
would fall if the entire recession were 
treated as one period. In practice, what  
we propose is a system where the quintile 
ranks would be recalibrated upon the re-
lease of new data, so that states could move up and 
down rankings as conditions either improved or 
worsened. As such, a state showing significant im-
provement might move down from the fifth quintile 
(most in need of aid based on the indicator) to the first 
quintile (least in need). Such a move would signifi-
cantly reduce the level of aid the state receives. What 
these tables illustrate is that the group of states that 
would receive the largest share of aid (quintile 5) 
would differ from recession to recession. For exam-
ple, the 1980 and 1982 recessions had a more signifi-
cant impact on manufacturing states, while the 1991 
recession had an East Coast/New England bias. 
Due to the poor timing of the sales tax trigger (as 
shown in figure 2), we will focus this part of our ex-
periment on the coincident index and unemployment 
triggers. One way to compare the quintiles that these 
two indicators generate is with scatter plots like those 
in figure 4. The vertical axis in each chart corresponds 
to the average coincident index quintile, and the hori-
zontal axis gives the average unemployment quintile. 
So each data point reveals the values of these two vari-
ables for a given state during a given recession. The two 
charts depicted here are of the 2001 (panel A) and 2008 
(panel B) recessions. For the 2001 recession, the aver-
age quintiles for the two indicators have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.6716; and for the 2008 recession, their 
correlation coefficient is 0.6994. In other words, the 
quintile rankings generated by the coincident index and 
unemployment indicators are similar but not identical.
Since the quintile rankings of the various indica-
tors often differ, it is possible that one indicator may 
favor certain states over another, which could have 
political repercussions. For example, if the unemploy-
ment quintiles of a given state have been historically 
higher than its coincident index quintiles, then we might 
expect the state’s legislators to push for the use of the 
unemployment trigger. Table A4 lists the states in as-
cending order according to the average ratio of their 
coincident index quintiles to their unemployment quin-
tiles. A value of less than one for this ratio indicates 
that the state’s unemployment quintiles were higher, 
on average, than its coincident index quintiles; and  
a value of greater than one indicates the reverse. So 
we might expect states with ratios significantly lower 
than one to prefer the unemployment quintile because 75 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
provided by Haver Analytics.
Unemployment plotted against state coincident indexes















































































































it would result in more federal aid, and vice versa for 
states with ratios significantly greater than one.
Distributing the aid
The results of a hypothetical implementation of 
our aid plan, with z = $130, are displayed in figure 5. 
These charts contrast the amounts of per capita aid 
that each state would have received under the unem-
ployment and coincident index triggers for the 2001 
(panel A) and 2008 (panel B) recessions. The diago-
nal line in each chart is a 45 degree line, so states  
that fall below this line would have received more aid 
per capita with the unemployment trigger than with 
the coincident index trigger. This feature is most visi-
ble in the 2001 recession, reflecting the fact that the 
unemployment trigger was active for a longer period 
than the coincident index trigger.76 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
provided by Haver Analytics.
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This article examines the use of three automatic 
triggers for starting and stopping countercyclical aid 
to state governments during a recession. While none 
of the triggers is perfect, it appears that the Philadel-
phia Fed’s state coincident indexes would do a better 
job of timing aid to reflect both the local intensity of 
the business cycle in individual states and the duration 
of the recession on a national level. The use of such a 
trigger would ensure that the aid is designed to reduce 
the stress related to the business cycle and not the stress 
caused by structural imbalances in a state’s economy 
or fiscal system.
What this article does not address is whether there 
should be a standing federal policy of providing re-
cessionary aid to the states. The use of any automatic 77 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
stabilizing policy assumes that maintaining state gov-
ernment programs should be a primary concern of fed-
eral policy. While the current structure allows for an 
arbitrary decision as to when the federal government 
does intervene, creating a federal insurance policy for 
state fiscal behavior clearly would raise some concerns. 
Some might argue that periodic budget crises may be 
necessary to force states to re-examine their spending 
priorities and bring them in line with what taxpayers 
are willing to pay. It may be possible to address the 
possible moral hazard concerns by creating additional 
mechanisms that would prevent states from undertak-
ing risky budget behavior or punish them for doing so. 
For example, more robust rainy day funds might be 
required or a “stress test” for each state’s budget un-
der different economic scenarios. Similarly, it might 
be wise to require states to pay into a national rainy 
day fund, thereby creating their own insurance system 
so they could self-fund countercyclical aid without 
relying on federal assistance (see Mattoon, 2003).
A related issue is a closer examination of the effi-
ciency with which states might spend recessionary aid. 
States will always prefer unrestricted aid that permits 
them to substitute new federal dollars for state dollars, 
but should federal aid come with strings attached? 
Further, is the state the proper recipient of the money? 
State funding formulas are often criticized for distrib-
uting aid to less populated areas, whereas money di-
rected to large metropolitan areas might have a greater 
impact. Should the federal government take a larger 
role in targeting the aid to promote the efficiency of 
aid spending?
Finally, further research is needed to examine 
whether the state fiscal cycle is significantly different 
from the business cycle. If it is likely that there are 
lags in which states experience fiscal pressure both 
entering and exiting a business cycle downturn, the 
timing of aid might need to be adjusted to reflect this. 
This might favor a trigger that starts aid several quar-
ters after a national recession begins and extends aid 
past the end of the recession. 
 
NOTES
1The breakdown for expenditures related to the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is: $288 billion in tax cuts for individuals 
and businesses; $224 billion for education, health care, and unem-
ployment insurance; and $275 billion for federal contracts, grants, 
and loans. See www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx.
2The business cycle refers to the periodic but irregular up-and-down 
movements in economic activity, measured by fluctuations in real gross 
domestic product and other macroeconomic variables. Countercyclical 
aid, provided by the federal government, is intended to smooth revenue 
contractions and expenditure increases that are associated with busi-
ness cycle declines.
3The ARRA differs from previous aid programs in that its stated goals 
emphasize economic stimulus and job creation, even though most 
of the money going to the states will go toward stabilizing Medicaid, 
education, and unemployment insurance. Specifically, the act’s three 
immediate goals are to: 1) create new jobs and save existing ones; 
2) spur economic activity and invest in long-term economic growth; 
and 3) foster unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency 
in government spending. See www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/
The_Act.aspx.
4Throughout this article, we refer to official periods of recession as 
identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
5Amadeo (2010). 
6Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1978).
7U.S. General Accounting Office (1977), p. i.
8Ibid., p. 19.
9Congressional Budget Office (1978), p. 60.
10U.S. General Accounting Office (2004), p. 7.
11U.S. Government Accounting Office (1977), pp. 6–7.
12U.S. Government Accounting Office (2004), p. 2.78 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIx: STATE RANkINGS BASED ON OUR THREE TRIGGERS
    TABlE A1
Ranking of states’ need for aid based on unemployment rate trigger
  Quintile 1           Quintile 5   
(lowest need)  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4         (highest need)
1981–83 recession 
Delaware  Rhode Island  Idaho  Washington  Utah
Hawaii  Connecticut  Louisiana  Iowa  Kentucky
New York  New Mexico  Kansas  Minnesota  Mississippi
Florida  Maryland  Vermont  Arkansas  Illinois
New Jersey  Maine  South Dakota  Nevada  Ohio
Massachusetts  Oklahoma  Nebraska  North Carolina  Indiana
Virginia  Montana  New Hampshire  Wyoming  Michigan
California  Pennsylvania  Colorado  Alabama  Missouri
Texas  Georgia  Arizona  Oregon  Wisconsin
Alaska  North Dakota  Tennessee  South Carolina  West Virginia
1991 recession
South Dakota  North Dakota  Illinois  Louisiana  Maryland
Montana  Alabama  Missouri  Mississippi  Delaware
Utah  New Mexico  Washington  South Carolina  Connecticut
Georgia  Arkansas  Ohio  Virginia  Massachusetts
Iowa  Idaho  Tennessee  Florida  Maine
Nebraska  Texas  Oregon  Pennsylvania  New Hampshire
Colorado  Oklahoma  Wisconsin  North Carolina  New Jersey
Wyoming  Arizona  Nevada  Michigan  New York
Hawaii  Minnesota  Alaska  California  Rhode Island
Kansas  Indiana  Kentucky  West Virginia  Vermont
2001 recession
Idaho  South Dakota  Tennessee  Connecticut  Wisconsin
Montana  Arkansas  Kansas  New York  Oregon
New Mexico  Georgia  Nevada  California  Utah
West Virginia  Iowa  Alabama  Minnesota  Indiana
North Dakota  Maryland  Mississippi  Oklahoma  Colorado
Rhode Island  Maine  Vermont  Arizona  Michigan
Delaware  Louisiana  Kentucky  Virginia  Missouri
Wyoming  Nebraska  Florida  New Jersey  North Carolina
Alaska  Pennsylvania  New Hampshire  Illinois  South Carolina
Hawaii  Ohio  Texas  Massachusetts  Washington
2008 recession
North Dakota  Oklahoma  Maine  Ohio  Minnesota
South Dakota  Texas  Pennsylvania  South Carolina  Georgia
Arkansas  Kansas  Washington  Colorado  North Carolina
Nebraska  Utah  Mississippi  Vermont  Tennessee
New Hampshire  New Mexico  New Jersey  Alabama  Illinois
Wisconsin  Massachusetts  Oregon  Arizona  Michigan
Iowa  Maryland  Delaware  Indiana  California
Wyoming  Montana  Kentucky  Idaho  Florida
West Virginia  New York  Virginia  Connecticut  Nevada
Alaska  Louisiana  Missouri  Hawaii  Rhode Island
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provided by Haver Analytics.79 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIx: STATE RANkINGS BASED ON OUR THREE TRIGGERS (CONTINUED)
    TABlE A2
Ranking of states’ need for aid based on sales tax rate trigger
  Quintile 1           Quintile 5   
(lowest need)  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4         (highest need)
1981–83 recession 
Texas  North Dakota  Hawaii  Wyoming  Missouri
Oklahoma  New Mexico  Iowa  West Virginia  Maryland
Maine  Arizona  Nevada  California  Washington
Connecticut  Louisiana  South Carolina  Ohio  New York
Idaho  Mississippi  Virginia  Tennessee  Kentucky
South Dakota  Nebraska  New Jersey  Alabama  Pennsylvania
Utah  Rhode Island  Florida  Colorado  Massachusetts
Vermont  Arkansas  Kansas  Michigan  Illinois
Minnesota  Georgia  North Carolina  Wisconsin  Indiana
1991 recession
Kentucky  Iowa  Texas  Wyoming  Colorado
Arkansas  Idaho  Vermont  Florida  Georgia
North Carolina  Kansas  Hawaii  Indiana  Ohio
Virginia  Maine  Illinois  Louisiana  Maryland
Washington  Minnesota  Oklahoma  Michigan  New York
New Mexico  Nebraska  Pennsylvania  Missouri  South Carolina
Arizona  New Jersey  South Dakota  Mississippi  Connecticut
Alabama  Nevada  North Dakota  Rhode Island  Massachusetts
California  Tennessee  Utah  Wisconsin  West Virginia
2001 recession
Rhode Island  Wyoming  Pennsylvania  Nevada  New Mexico
Arkansas  Kansas  Wisconsin  Massachusetts  Ohio
Arizona  North Carolina  Colorado  Missouri  Connecticut
Idaho  Mississippi  Virginia  Tennessee  Washington
New Jersey  North Dakota  Alabama  Texas  Kentucky
Nebraska  Oklahoma  Illinois  New York  Florida
South Dakota  Hawaii  Maine  South Carolina  Utah
Vermont  Iowa  Maryland  Georgia  California
West Virginia  Louisiana  Michigan  Indiana  Minnesota
2008 recession
North Dakota  Utah  Mississippi  Iowa  Massachusetts
Oklahoma  Alabama  North Carolina  New Mexico  Michigan
South Dakota  Indiana  Virginia  South Carolina  Connecticut
Wyoming  Maine  Colorado  Arizona  Pennsylvania
Idaho  Kansas  Nebraska  Kentucky  California
Vermont  West Virginia  Tennessee  Missouri  Florida
Rhode Island  Arkansas  Louisiana  Wisconsin  Minnesota
Texas  Washington  New Jersey  Georgia  New York
Hawaii  Maryland  Nevada  Illinois  Ohio
Note: States that do not have a sales tax were excluded from the analysis. As a result, each quintile in this table lists nine states instead of ten. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census provided by Haver Analytics.80 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIx: STATE RANkINGS BASED ON OUR THREE TRIGGERS (CONTINUED)
    TABlE A3
Ranking of states’ need for aid based on Philadelphia Fed state coincident indexes trigger
  Quintile 1           Quintile 5   
(lowest need)  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4         (highest need)
1980 recession 
Colorado   Connecticut   North Carolina   Alabama   Idaho 
Florida   Arizona   Maryland   Arkansas   Indiana 
Hawaii   Delaware   Maine   Iowa   Kentucky 
Louisiana   Georgia   Mississippi   Illinois   Michigan 
New Hampshire   Massachusetts   North Dakota   Kansas   Missouri 
Oklahoma   New Jersey   Rhode Island   Minnesota   Montana 
Texas   Nevada   South Carolina   Nebraska   Ohio 
Virginia   New York   Tennessee   South Dakota   Oregon 
Wyoming   Utah   Vermont   Wisconsin   Pennsylvania 
California   New Mexico   Alaska   Washington   West Virginia 
1982 recession
Alaska   New Mexico   Louisiana   Nebraska   Idaho 
Connecticut   New York   Maine   Nevada   Indiana 
Florida   Delaware   Hawaii   Kansas   Pennsylvania 
New Hampshire   Massachusetts   Rhode Island   Arkansas   Iowa 
Utah   California   Tennessee   South Dakota   Michigan 
Georgia   Arizona   Wyoming   Alabama   Montana 
Colorado   North Dakota   South Carolina   Kentucky   Ohio 
New Jersey   Oklahoma   Wisconsin   Minnesota   Oregon 
Virginia   Vermont   Maryland   Missouri   Washington 
Texas   North Carolina   Mississippi   Illinois   West Virginia 
1991 recession
Arkansas   New Mexico   Nevada   Missouri   Michigan 
Arizona   Oklahoma   California   North Carolina   Pennsylvania 
Colorado   South Dakota   Alabama   New Jersey   Alaska 
Hawaii   Tennessee   Delaware   Ohio   Connecticut 
Iowa   Texas   Florida   Oregon   Massachusetts 
Idaho   Utah   Georgia   South Carolina   Maryland 
Louisiana   Wisconsin   Illinois   Washington   Maine 
Montana   Kansas   Indiana   West Virginia   New Hampshire 
North Dakota   Mississippi   Kentucky   New York   Rhode Island 
Nebraska   Minnesota   Virginia   Wyoming   Vermont 
2001 recession
Alaska   Maine   Connecticut   Georgia   Massachusetts 
Montana   Nebraska   Virginia   Illinois   North Carolina 
North Dakota   Florida   California   Kentucky   Nevada 
New Mexico   Arizona   Arkansas   Minnesota   Alabama 
Rhode Island   Idaho   Hawaii   Mississippi   Indiana 
South Dakota   Louisiana   Iowa   Ohio   Michigan 
Wyoming   Utah   New Hampshire   Tennessee   New York 
Maryland   Vermont   Oklahoma   Pennsylvania   Oregon 
New Jersey   Delaware   Texas   Colorado   South Carolina 
West Virginia   Kansas   Wisconsin   Missouri   Washington 81 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIx: STATE RANkINGS BASED ON OUR THREE TRIGGERS (CONTINUED)
    TABlE A3 (continued)
Ranking of states’ need for aid based on Philadelphia Fed state coincident indexes trigger
  Quintile 1           Quintile 5   
(lowest need)  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4         (highest need)
2008 recession
Alaska   Utah   Arkansas   North Carolina   Rhode Island 
Louisiana   Virginia   Connecticut   Vermont   Arizona 
North Dakota   Wisconsin   New York   Minnesota   Delaware 
Nebraska   Iowa   California   Alabama   Florida 
Oklahoma   Kansas   Indiana   Georgia   Idaho 
Texas   New Hampshire   Missouri   Kentucky   Michigan 
Wyoming   South Dakota   New Jersey   Maryland   Nevada 
New Mexico   Massachusetts   Tennessee   Maine   Oregon 
West Virginia   Mississippi   Hawaii   Pennsylvania   South Carolina 
Colorado   Montana   Illinois   Ohio   Washington
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provided by Haver Analytics.
    TABlE A4
Average ratio of state coincident index to unemployment
State  Quintile ratio  State  Quintile ratio
Louisiana  0.60  Kentucky  1.07
Virginia  0.74   Nebraska  1.08
Oklahoma  0.80   New Hampshire  1.08
California  0.81  North Dakota  1.09
Wisconsin  0.82  Maine  1.09
North Carolina  0.82  West Virginia  1.12
Mississippi  0.83  Maryland  1.13
Texas  0.84  Oregon  1.17
Florida  0.86  Alaska  1.19
New Mexico  0.87  Massachusetts  1.21
Vermont  0.87  Alabama  1.27
Colorado  0.88  New York  1.30
Utah  0.90  South Dakota  1.30
Connecticut  0.90  Rhode Island  1.31
Indiana  0.92  Hawaii  1.35
Arizona  0.93  Ohio  1.37
New Jersey  0.94  Washington  1.37
Minnesota  0.94  Wyoming  1.42
Illinois  0.95  Georgia  1.43
Missouri  0.97  Montana  1.48
Tennessee  0.99  Idaho  1.54
South Carolina  1.01  Arkansas  1.57
Nevada  1.02  Delaware  1.62
Michigan  1.03  Iowa  1.63
Kansas  1.04  Pennsylvania  1.67
Note: A value less than 1.0 indicates that the state’s unemployment quintiles were higher, on average, than its coincident index quintiles;  
a value greater than 1.0 indicates the reverse.   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provided by Haver Analytics.82 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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